U.S. Steel is the profile that most clearly justifies building a decision-rights table instead of a cap table.
The ownership question has a one-word answer. On June 18, 2025, the merger with Nippon Steel completed, every share of common stock became the right to receive $55.00 in cash, and the company survived as a subsidiary of Nippon Steel North America. It deregistered twelve days later. There is no float, no minority, and no second class of common.
So the Control Wedge is zero, and the zero is informative. Votes track ownership exactly. Whatever constrains the owner of this company is not in the share register.
One share, and what it does
Five days before closing, on June 13, 2025, the company entered a National Security Agreement with Nippon Steel, its US parent, and the U.S. Government, represented by the Treasury and Commerce Departments. Under it, U.S. Steel issues a single share of Class G Preferred Stock — the filing itself calls it "the Golden Share" — to the U.S. Government.
The 8-K describes the effect in one sentence: through its ownership of the Golden Share, the U.S. Government has certain rights over non-ordinary-course matters, including matters relating to governance, domestic production, and trade.
One share. No dividend, no meaningful economic claim, no ordinary vote. Its entire value is the word "certain" in that sentence.
Why this belongs in a control dataset
An ownership-percentage analysis of U.S. Steel returns "100% Nippon Steel" and stops. That answer is complete, accurate, and wrong about who can do what.
Both decision rights below are recorded as needing another party's agreement, and unusually the other party is a government rather than a shareholder. The sole stockholder of a Delaware corporation ordinarily elects the entire board and approves a sale by written consent in an afternoon. Here it cannot do either free of a consent right held by an entity with no economic stake at all.
That is the same structural shape as Bosch and Bertelsmann — authority separated from economics — arrived at by an entirely different route. Bosch used a founder's will. Bertelsmann used a management company. U.S. Steel used a regulatory settlement attached to a preferred share. The mechanism differs; the question a reader needs answered does not.
What is not established here
The specific list of vetoes. The 8-K describes the government's rights only by category, and the National Security Agreement itself is not among the filed exhibits reviewed here. Widely reported specifics — consent over relocating headquarters, closing facilities, moving production abroad, changing the company's name — are not established by the primary source cited above and are deliberately not stated as fact in the table.
Also the duration. Nothing in the filing reviewed sets an end date, but absence of a stated expiry in an 8-K summary is not the same as a perpetual right, and the underlying agreement would settle it.