Castel is the case where an ownership percentage explains nothing at all.
The group is privately held, so there is no beneficial-ownership table to read and no voting percentage to publish. This profile therefore carries no economic or voting figure, and no Control Wedge. That absence is the finding rather than a gap in the research: the family's authority does not run through a share register in a way that resolves to a number.
What it runs through instead is a chain. A discretionary Singapore trust sits above Investment Beverage Business Management, which sits above Cassiopée and D.F. Holding, which sit above the operating companies that actually brew and sell. The heirs are beneficiaries of the trust. A beneficiary receives; a shareholder votes. Those are different rights, and only one of them appears at a shareholders' meeting.
The consequence showed up in 2026. Holders of 72.33% of the top entity passed resolutions removing the group's chief executive, and the board of that entity said the resolutions were not validly passed. Removal at the top did not cascade downward, because the boards of the intermediate companies continued to back the incumbent, and the chief executive's job sits at a different company from the one where the vote was taken.
Both decision rights below are marked as needing another body's agreement, and that is the same finding stated twice. On the record currently available, no single party can carry either decision alone. That is what the contested status means here. It is not a hedge about who deserves to win — it is the structural fact that the chain was built to make unilateral action difficult, and on this evidence it succeeded.
The claims above are sourced to press reporting rather than to filed constitutional documents. Singapore and Luxembourg registry filings would establish the chain directly, and this profile should be upgraded to those sources before any quantitative claim is added to it.